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Abstract—We investigate fundamental limits among identifica-
tion, secrecy, template, and privacy-leakage rates in biometric
identification system with secret binding from an information
theoretic perspective. Ignatenko and Willems (2015) studied the
system with estimation of individuals and clarified the fundamen-
tal limit among identification, secrecy, and privacy-leakage rates
provided that the enrollment channel of the system is noiseless.
In the enrollment process, however, it is highly considerable
that noise occurs when bio-data is scanned. Recently, Günlü and
Kramer (2018) analyzed the system assuming that the channel is
noisy when there is only one individual. In this paper, we analyze
the model considering the estimation of individuals under noisy
enrollment and characterize the capacity region of identification,
secrecy, template, and privacy-leakage rates in the biometric
identification system with secret binding. The obtained result
shows that it reduces to the one given by Ignatenko and Willems
(2015) as a special case where the enrollment channel is noiseless.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric identification indicates the process of comparing
biological characteristics or data (bio-data) of an individual to
that individual’s template already stored in a secure system
database where several other individuals’ information kept
as well. Some well-known applications are fingerprint-based
identification, iris-based identification, voice recognition, etc.
O’Sullivan and Schmid [13] and Willems et al. [16] sep-
arately introduced the discrete memoryless biometric identi-
fication system (BIS). Willems et al. [16] have clarified the
identification capacity of the BIS, which is the maximum
achievable rate of the number of individuals when the error
probability converges to zero as the length of biometric data
sequences goes to infinity. However, the implementation in
[16] stores bio-data sequences in the system database in a plain
form, leading to a critical privacy-leakage threat. Later, Tuncel
[14] has developed their model by incorporating compression
of bio-data sequences and clarified the capacity region of
identification and coding rates (In this study, a codeword or
helper data is called a template, and this coding rate is called
the template rate).
Besides, there are several studies dealing with the secrecy
rate of BIS. An example of them is the BIS model with secret
binding. This is a model in which secret data of individual is
chosen at random and the template is generated by individual’s
bio-data and secret data. In this scenario, we call the BIS
model with secret binding the chosen secret BIS (CS-BIS)
model. In the CS-BIS model, the given secret data or secret key
is chosen independently of bio-data. Ignatenko and Willems
[7] and Lai et al. [11] investigated the fundamental trade-off
between secret data and privacy-leakage rates in the CS-BIS
model. Ignatenko and Willems [9] continued working on the
model and characterized the capacity region of identification,
secrecy, and privacy-leakage rates in the CS-BIS. One thing to
be noted is that the three studies mentioned above assumed the
enrollment channel to be noiseless. However, when bio-data is
scanned, it is highly considerable that bio-data sequences are
subject to noise so it is important to consider the enrollment
channel is noisy like in [6], [14], [16], and [18]. Related to
the studies on the CS-BIS model, a generated secret BIS (GS-
BIS) model, where secret data is extracted from bio-data, is
studied in [6]–[11], [17], and [18].
Studies on the CS-BIS model without estimation of indi-
viduals and incorporating the analysis of the template rate as
well as the secrecy and privacy-leakage rates can be found
in [6] and [12]. Koide and Yamamoto [12] analyzed the
model for non-negligible secrecy-leakage. Günlü and Kramer
[6] evaluated the model by treating the enrollment channel
is noisy and the benefit of having single individual made a
successful breakthrough for them to characterize the capacity
region by one auxiliary random variable (RV) in an elegant
way. When the model is extended to the one by considering
individual’s estimation, it is difficult to use the same analyzing
techniques, especially the evaluating of privacy-leakage rate,
to characterize the capacity region. In the GS-BIS scenario,
Yachongka and Yagi [18] have characterized the capacity
region with two auxiliary RVs recently. Then, an interesting
question is if the same argument also works for the CS-BIS
scenario.
In this paper, we are interested in deriving the capacity
region of identification, secrecy, template, and privacy-leakage
rates of the CS-BIS model. Compared to the model proposed
in [9], we analyze the region under conditions that
1) there is a noisy channel in the enrollment phase,
2) we consider a scheme of both compressing template (as
in [6] and [14]) and protecting privacy (as in [9] and
[11]),
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3) we analyze the capacity region provided that the prior
distribution of an identified individual is unknown.
To handle the bottleneck of evaluating privacy-leakage in the
achievability proof, we introduce an auxiliary RV correspond-
ing to a template of individual. The obtained characterization
of the region is basically different from the ones derived in [6]
and [9]. As a special case, it can be checked that our result
reduces to the one in [9, Theorem 2] where the enrollment
channel is noiseless.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we define notation used in this paper and
describe the details of the system model.
A. Notation
Calligraphic A stands for a finite alphabet. Upper-case A
denotes a RV taking values in A and lower-case a ∈ A
denotes its realization. PA(a) := Pr[A = a], a ∈ A,
represents the probability distribution on A, and PAn repre-
sents the probability distribution of RV An = (A1, · · · , An)
in An, the nth Cartesian product of A. PAnBn represents the
joint probability distribution of a pair of RVs (An, Bn) and
its conditional probability distribution PAn|Bn is defined as
PAn|Bn(an|bn) = PAnBn (a
n,bn)
PBn (bn)
for any an ∈ An, bn ∈ Bn
such that PBn(bn) > 0. Throughout this paper, logarithms are
of base two. Integers m and n such that m < n, [m,n] denotes
the set {m,m+ 1, · · · , n}. A partial sequence of a sequence
cn from the first symbol to the tth symbol (c1, · · · , ct) is
represented by ct.
We define the strong typicality property as below. A se-
quence xn ∈ Xn is said to be δ-strongly typical with respect
to a distribution pX on X if | 1nN(a|xn) − PX(a)| ≤ δ and
PX(a) = 0 implies 1nN(a|xn) = 0 for all a ∈ X , where
N(a|xn) is the number of occurrences of a in the sequence
xn, and δ is an arbitrary positive number. The set of sequences
xn ∈ Xn such that xn is δ-strongly typical is called the
strongly typical set and is denoted by A(n) (X), which is the
same notation in [3]. This concept is easily extended to joint
distributions.
B. Model Descriptions
The CS-BIS model considered in this paper is shown in Fig.
1. Basically, it consists of two phases: (I) Enrollment Phase
and (II) Identification Phase. Next we explain the details of
each phase.
(I) Enrollment Phase:
Let I = {1, 2, · · ·MI} and X be the set of indexes of
individuals and a finite source alphabet, respectively. For any
i ∈ I, we assume that xni = (xi1, · · · , xin) ∈ Xn, an n-length
bio-data sequence of individual i, is generated i.i.d. from a
stationary memoryless source PX . The generating probability
for each sequence xni ∈ Xn is
PXn
i
(xni ) := Pr[X
n
i = x
n
i ] =
∏n
k=1
PX(xik). (1)
Now let J = {1, 2, · · ·MJ} and S = {1, 2, · · ·MS} be
the set of indexes of templates stored in the database and
Fig. 1. CS-BIS model
individuals’ secret data, respectively. All bio-data sequences
are observed via a discrete memoryless channel (DMC)
{Y, PY |X ,X}, where Y is a finite output-alphabet of PY |X .
The corresponding probability that xni ∈ Xn is observed as
yni = (yi1, yi2, · · · , yin) ∈ Yn via the DMC PY |X is
Pr[Y ni = y
n
i |Xni = xni ] =
∏n
k=1
PY |X(yik|xik) (2)
for all i ∈ I.
A secret data s(i) ∈ S is chosen uniformly at random and
independent of all other RVs. Encoder mapping f encodes yni
and s(i) into template j(i) ∈ J as j(i) = f(yni , s(i)). The
template j(i) is stored at position i in the database, which can
be accessed by the decoder.
(II) Identification Phase:
Bio-data sequence xnw (w ∈ I) of an unknown w (index of
individual w having enrolled in the database) is observed via
a DMC {Z, PZ|X ,X}, where Z is a finite output-alphabet
of PZ|X . The probability that xnw ∈ Xn is output as zn =
(z1, z2, · · · , zn) ∈ Zn via PZ|X is given by
Pr[Zn = zn|Xnw = xnw] =
∏n
k=1
PZ|X(zk|xwk). (3)
The sequence zn is passed to the decoder Zn × JMI −→
I×S, comparing zn with templates in the database and outputs
the pair of estimated value (ŵ, ŝ(w)).
Remark 1. RV W is independent of Xni , Y ni , J(i), S(i) and
Zn for an arbitrary i ∈ I. In this paper, we assume neither
that the identified individual index W are uniformly distributed
over I nor that there is a prior distribution of W .
The motivation of analyzing the BIS provided that the
distribution of W is unknown is that the frequencies of coming
to use the system for each individual are likely different. For
example, it is hard to think that each customer uses service of
a bank teller at the same rate. Therefore, to get closer to real
application, this assumption is important to take care of.
Fig. 2. The rate region of CS-BIS model
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Fig. 3. Projection of the rate region onto RJRI -plain
III. DEFINITIONS AND MAIN RESULTS
The formal definition of the addressed problem and the main
theorem of this study are given below.
Definition 1. A tuple of an identification, secrecy, template,
privacy-leakage rates (RI , RS , RJ , RL) is said to be achiev-
able if for any δ > 0 and large enough n there exist pairs of
encoders and decoders that satisfy for all i ∈ I
Pr{(Ŵ , ̂S(W )) 6= (W,S(W ))|W = i} ≤ δ, (4)
1
n
logMI ≥ RI − δ, (5)
1
n
logMJ ≤ RJ + δ, (6)
1
n
logMS ≥ RS − δ, (7)
1
n
I(Xni ; J(i)) ≤ RL + δ, (8)
1
n
I(S(i); J(i)) ≤ δ. (9)
Moreover, the capacity region R is defined as the closure of
the set of all achievable rate tuples.
In Definition 1, (4) is the condition of identification error
probability (IEP) of individual i which should be arbitrarily
small. Equations (5), (6) and (7) are the constraints related
to identification, template and secrecy rates, respectively. In
terms of the privacy protection perspective, we measure the
information leakage of individual i by (8) and (9). Condition
(8) measures the amount of privacy-leakage of original bio-
data Xni from template J(i) in the database and it must be
smaller than or equal to RL + δ. Condition (9) measures the
secrecy-leakage between the template and the secret data of
individual i and it requires that the leaked amount is arbitrarily
small.
Theorem 1. The capacity region for the CS-BIS model is given
by
R = {(RI , RS ,RJ , RL) : 0 ≤ RI +RS ≤ I(Z;U),
RI ≤ [I(Y ;V )− I(Y ;U) + I(Z;U)]+,
RJ ≥ I(Y ;U),
RL ≥ I(X;V )}, (10)
where RVs X , Y , Z, U , and V form a Markov chain Z−X−
Y −U−V , [0, a]+ = max{0, a}, and V and U take values in
some finite alphabets U and V with |U| ≤ (|Y|+ 2)(|Y|+ 1)
and |V| ≤ |Y|+ 2.
Likewise the observation in [6], the capacity region of
Theorem 1 is clearly smaller than the capacity region of the
GS-BIS model characterized in [18], where RJ is bounded by
I(Y ;V ). The ranges of identification, secrecy, and privacy-
leakage rates do not change but the range of template rate does.
A remark given in [17] indicated that in case the enrollment
channel is noiseless (X = Y ), the fundamental limit of RL
and RJ is identical for the GS-BIS model. However, the result
of this study implies that this remark does not hold for the CS-
BIS model.
As a special case, it is easy to check that Theorem 1
reduces to the region derived in [9, Theorem 2], which was
characterized by a single auxiliary RV, when X = Y and the
template rate RJ is allowed to be arbitrary large. On the other
hand, the characterization in Theorem 1 requires two auxiliary
RVs. The difference between RI is zero (as in [6]) and positive
(as in [18] and this study) also appears in the analysis of RL.
At this point, we have not yet found any method to establish
Theorem 1 by using only one auxiliary RV.
A numerical result of the rate region given by the right-
hand side of Eq. (10) where RS = 0 is shown in Fig. 2. This
is a three-dimensional figure of RI (z-axis) as a function of
RJ (x-axis) and RL (y-axis) and the figure was plotted under
the following settings. Alphabets X ,Y , and Z is assumed
to be binary. We fix source probability PX(0) = 0.5 and
Fig. 4. CS-BIS encoder
transition probability of channels PY |X(0|0) = PY |X(1|1) =
PZ|X(0|0) = PZ|X(1|1) = 0.9 and we also restrict the size
of U and V to 2, which does not lose the general behaviors
of the rate region. The achievable rate region of the rate tuple
(RI , RJ , RL) is the region below the curved surface of Fig. 2
in the direction of blue arrow and this is a convex region. Fig.
3 is a projection of the rate region (Fig. 2) onto the RJRI
plain and the area shaded purple represents the achievable
area. Apparently, the area behaves in the same manner as the
calculated graph shown in [14].
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A. Achievability (Direct Part)
The proof idea of this part is similar to the achievability
proof of the GS-BIS model provided in [18]. The difference is
we use the encoder and decoder of the GS-BIS as components
inside the encoder and decoder of the CS-BIS. In order to
avoid the confusion in the following arguments, we introduce
some new notations which are used only in this part. JC(i) and
SC(i) denote the template J(i) and the chosen secret data S(i)
of individual i for the CS-BIS encoder. Also, JG(i) and SG(i)
denote the template and secret data of individual i generated
by the GS-BIS encoder. Moreover, MJC and MJG denote the
number of templates of the CS-BIS and of the GS-BIS1.
More specifically, we deploy a so-called masking layer as
shown in Fig. 4 to mask the secret data SC(i) ∈ S for the CS-
BIS by using SG(i) ∈ S. The template JC(i) is the combined
information of JG(i) and the masked data SC(i)⊕SG(i), i.e.,
JC(i) = (JG(i), SC(i)⊕ SG(i)). (11)
At the decoder in the CS-BIS, the decoder of the GS-BIS first
estimates SG(i) and output the estimate as ŜG(i), and thus
the chosen secret data can be retrieved by
ŜC(i) = SC(i)⊕ SG(i)	 ŜG(i), (12)
where ⊕ and 	 denote addition and subtraction modulo MS .
This technique is also used in [1], [6], [7], and [9].
First, we fix δ > 0 and a block length n. We choose test
channels PU |Y and PV |U . We set2 RI = I(Y ;V )−I(Y ;U)+
1Normally, JC(i), SC(i), and MJC are denoted by J(i), S(i), and MJ
in other sections of this paper.
2Note that in this setting, the value of RI can sometimes be negative.
However, if I(Y ;V ) ≤ I(Y ;U) − I(Z;U), then we set RI = 0. This is
the case where there is no consideration of individuals’ estimation and that
was studied in [6].
I(Z;U)−δ , RS = I(Y ;U)−I(Y ;V )−δ, RJ = I(Y ;U)+δ,
and RL = I(X;V )+2δ. We also set the number of individuals
MI = 2
nRI , the number of secret data MS = 2nRS , and
the number of templates for CS-BIS encoder MJC = 2
nRJ ,
including the number of templates for GS-BIS encoder MJG =
MJC
MS
= 2n(I(Y ;V )+2δ), respectively.
Random Code Generation:
Sequences vnm are generated i.i.d. from PV for
m ∈ [1,MJG ], a subset of the set [1,MJC ]. Each j˜(m)
is assigned to vnm randomly and uniformly from the set
[1,MJG ]. For each m, sequences u
n
k|m are generated from
PUn|V n=vnm for k ∈ [1,MS ]. Each s˜(k,m) is assigned to
unk|m randomly and uniformly from [1,MS].
Encoding (Enrollment):
When the GS-BIS encoder, which is used as a component in
the CS-BIS encoder, observes the bio-data sequence yni ∈ Yn,
it determines the pair of jG(i) and sG(i). The encoder looks
for m and k satisfying (yni , v
n
m, u
n
k|m) ∈ A(n) (Y V U). We set
jG(i) = j˜(m) and sG(i) = s˜(k,m). In case there do not exist
such m and k or there are multiple pairs of such m and k,
we set jG(i) = j˜(1) and sG(i) = s˜(1, 1). Then, the CS-BIS
encoder uses the secret data sG(i) generated by the component
to conceal the chosen secret sC(i) by addition modulo MS like
sC(i)⊕ sG(i). This masked information is attached to jG(i),
and jC(i) = (jG(i), sC(i)⊕ sG(i)) is stored at position i in
the database.
Decoding (Identification):
When the GS-BIS decoder, used as a component in the CS-
BIS decoder, observes zn ∈ Zn (the noisy version of xnw),
it finds m and k such that (zn, vnm, u
n
k|m) ∈ A(n) (ZV U).
Then, it determines ŵ as the index of template where
jG(ŵ) = j˜(m) in the database and ̂sG(w) = s˜(k,m).
If there do not exist such m and k or there are multiple
pairs of such m and k, the component outputs (j˜(1), s˜(1, 1)).
Finally, the CS-BIS decoder outputs ŵ as the index of tem-
plate which is previously determined by the component and̂sC(w) = sC(w)⊕ sG(w)	 ̂sG(w) as the result of subtraction
modulo MS between the masked information and the esti-
mated ̂sG(w). We set (ŵ, ŝ(w)) = g(zn, j(1), · · · , j(MI)).
Next we shall check the conditions of (4)–(9) in Definition
1 averaged over randomly chosen codebook Cn.
Intermediate Steps:
Before advancing further, we provide important lemmas that
play important roles in the rest of the evaluations.
Lemma 1. (Willems and Ignatenko [15])
It holds that
H(Y ni |JG(i), SG(i), Cn) ≤ nδn log |Y|+ 1, (13)
where δn denotes some positive value satisfying δn ↓ 0 as
n→∞.
(Proof) The proof is provided in [15, Proof of Theorem 1],
so we omit it in this paper.
Lemma 2. (Kittichokechai et al. [10])
Assume that (Xni , Y
n
i , V
n
i ) are -strongly typical with high
probability3. Then, it holds that
H(Y ni |Xni , V ni , Cn) ≤ n(H(Y |X,V ) + δn). (14)
(Proof) The proof can be found in [10, Appendix C].
Analysis of Error Probability:
The operation at the decoder (12) means that ̂SC(W ) =
SC(W ) only if ̂SG(W ) = SG(W ) for Ŵ = i. It is proved
that the IEP of individual i for the GS-BIS model can be
made that Pr{(Ŵ , ̂SG(W )) 6= (W,SG(W ))|W = i} ≤ 4δ.
The detailed proof is available in Appendix A-A.
Therefore, it is obvious that the IEP of individual i for the
CS-BIS model can also be bounded by
Pr{(Ŵ , ̂SC(W )) 6= (W,SC(W ))|W = i} ≤ 4δ (15)
for large enough n.
Analysis of Template and Secrecy Rates:
Because RJ = 1n logMJC , it is easy to confirm that (6)
holds from the parameter settings. Similarly, it is obvious that
(7) holds.
Analysis of Secrecy-Leakage:
We invoke the following relation on secrecy-leakage be-
tween the CS-BIS model and the GS-BIS model [9, Appendix
B-A]:
I(JC(i);SC(i)|Cn) = I(JG(i), SC(i)⊕ SG(i);SC(i)|Cn)
≤ I(JG(i);SG(i)|Cn). (16)
It is showed that the secrecy-leakage of the GS-BIS model can
be bounded by 1nI(JG(i);SG(i)|Cn) ≤ 3δ for large enough
n. The detail proof can be seen in Appendix A-B.
From (16), it is clear that the secrecy-leakage of the CS-BIS
model can also be bounded by
1
n
I(JC(i);SC(i)|Cn) ≤ 3δ (17)
as well for large enough n.
Analysis of Privacy-Leakage Rate:
It is shown in [9, Appendix B-A] that
I(Xni ; JC(i)|Cn) = I(Xni ; JG(i), SC(i)⊕ SG(i)|Cn)
≤ I(Xni ; JG(i)|Cn). (18)
It is showed that the privacy-leakage of the GS-BIS model
can be bounded by 1nI(X
n
i ; JG(i)|Cn) ≤ I(X;V ) + 3δ for
large enough n. The detail proof is available in Appendix A-
C. Then, the privacy-leakage of the CS-BIS Model can be
made that
1
n
I(Xni ; JC(i)|Cn) ≤ RL + δ (19)
for large enough n.
3It means that Pr{(Xni , Y ni , V ni ) ∈ A
(n)
 (XY V )} → 1 as n → ∞,
where A(n) (XY V ) denotes the set of -strongly typical sequences.
Finally, applying the selection lemma [2, Lemma 2.2] to
above results , we can conclude that there exists at least a
codebook satisfying all conditions in Definition 1 for large
enough n.
B. Converse Part
For the converse proof, we consider a more relaxed case
where identified individual index W is uniformly distributed
over I and (4) is replaced with the average error criterion
Pr{(Ŵ , ̂S(W )) 6= (W,S(W ))} ≤ δ. (20)
We shall show that the capacity region, which is not smaller
than the original one, is contained in the right-hand side of
(10).
We assume that a rate tuple (RI , RS , RJ , RL) is achievable
so that there exists a pair of encoder and decoder (f, g) such
that all conditions in Definition 1 with replacing (4) by (20)
are satisfied for any δ > 0 and large enough n.
During the process of the proof, we employ
Fano’s inequality [8], [9] and [15] which states that
H(W,S(W )|Ŵ , ̂S(W )) ≤ 1 + Pr{(Ŵ , ̂S(W )) 6=
(W,S(W ))} logMIMS .
Here, we provide other key lemmas used in this part.
Lemma 3. (Ignatenko and Willems [9])
The joint entropy of W and S(W ) is bounded by
H(W,S(W ))
≤ 1 + Pr{(Ŵ , ̂S(W )) 6= (W,S(W ))} logMIMS
+ I(W,S(W ); J(1), · · · , J(MI), Zn). (21)
(Proof) The proof is given in [9, Proof of Theorem 1].
For t ∈ [1, n], we define auxiliary RVs Ut and Vt as Ut =
(Zt−1, J(W ), S(W )) and Vt = (Zt−1, J(W )), respectively.
We denote a sequence of RVs XnW = (X1(W ), · · · , Xn(W ))
and Y nW = (Y1(W ), · · · , Yn(W )).
Lemma 4. (Ignatenko and Willems [7])
The following Markov chains hold: Zt−1 −
(Y t−1(W ), J(W ))−Yt(W ) and Zt−1−(Xt−1(W ), J(W ))−
Xt(W ).
(Proof) The proof is given in [7, Appendix B].
Lemma 5. There exist some RVs U and V which satisfy Z −
X − Y − U − V and
n∑
t=1
I(Zt;Ut) = nI(Z;U), (22)
n∑
t=1
I(Yt(W );Ut) = nI(Y ;U), (23)
n∑
t=1
I(Yt(W );Vt) = nI(Y ;V ), (24)
n∑
t=1
I(Xt(W );Vt) = nI(X;V ). (25)
(Proof) The proof of Lemma 5 is provided in Appendix
B-A.
We fix RVs U and V specified in Lemma 5 for subsequent
arguments.
Analysis of Identification and Secrecy Rates:
It can be shown that
RI +RS − 2δ ≤ 11−δ (I(Z;U) + 2δ + 1n ), (26)
and4
RI ≤ I(Y ;V )− I(Y ;U) + 11−δ
(
I(Z;U) + 2δ + 1n
)
+ δ.
(27)
The proof is shown in Appendix B-B.
Analysis of Template Rate:
We use similar arguments provided in [6] to prove the range
of RJ . From (6), it holds that
n(RJ + δ) ≥ logMJ ≥ H(J(W ))
= I(J(W ), S(W );Y nW )−H(S(W )|J(W ))
+H(J(W ), S(W )|Y nW )
(a)
= I(J(W ), S(W );Y nW ) + I(J(W );S(W ))
≥ I(J(W ), S(W );Y nW )
(b)
=
n∑
t=1
I(Yt(W ); J(W ), S(W ), Y
t−1(W ))
(c)
≥
n∑
t=1
I(Yt(W ); J(W ), S(W ), Z
t−1)
=
n∑
t=1
I(Yt(W );Ut)) = nI(Y ;U), (28)
where (a) because J(W ) is a function of (Y nW , S(W )) and
S(W ) is independent of Y nW , (b) follows from the chain rule of
mutual information and each symbol of Y nW is i.i.d. generated,
(c) follows because Zt−1−(Y t−1(W ), J(W ), S(W ))−Yt(W )
which can be proved by similar arguments in [7, Appendix B],
and the last equality of (28) follows from (24) in Lemma 5.
Analysis of Privacy-Leakage Rate:
It can be proved that
RL + δ ≥ I(X;V ). (29)
The proof is provided in Appendix B-C.
By letting n → ∞ and δ ↓ 0, we obtain that the capacity
region is contained in the right-hand side of (10) from (26)–
(29).
To prove the bound on the cardinalities of the sets of U and
V , we use the the support lemma in [5, Lemma 15.4] to show
that |V| should have |Y| − 1 elements to preserve PV |U and
three more elements I(Z;U), I(Y ;V ) and I(X;V ). It means
|V| ≤ |Y|+ 2. Similarly, it can be proved that the size of set
|U| should have at most (|Y| + 2)(|Y| + 1) by the argument
in [4, Appendix].
4Recall again that if I(Y ;V ) ≤ I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U), we set RI = 0.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this study, we characterized the fundamental trade-off
among identification, secrecy, template, and privacy-leakage
rates in the CS-BIS model. We modified the system model
proposed in [9] by introducing noisy enrollment as in [6] and
deriving the capacity region provided that the prior distribution
of identified individual is unknown
It appears that the characterization of the capacity region
for the CS-BIS model also requires two auxiliary RVs like the
region obtained in [18]. This is basically different from the
result of the original work in [6]–[11] and [14]. As special
cases, this result reduces to the region given in [9, Theorem
1] when the enrollment channel is noiseless. For future work,
we analyze the capacity region of both CS-BIS and GS-
BIS models under strong secrecy criterion regarding secrecy-
leakage.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTS FOR ACHIEVABILITY
A. Analysis of Error Probability
For each i ∈ I, we denote by V ni and Uni the RVs
corresponding to the sequences vnm and u
n
k|m determined by
the GS-BIS encoder given Y ni = y
n
i . For W = i, a possible
event of errors occurs at the encoder is:
E1: (Y ni , V ni , Uni ) /∈ A(n) (Y V U),
and those at the decoder are:
E2: (Zn, V ni , Uni ) /∈ A(n) (ZV U),
E3: for some i′ 6= i such that (Zn, V ni′ , Uni′ ) ∈
A
(n)
 (ZV U).
Then, the IEP of individual i can be evaluated as
Pr{(Ŵ , ̂S(W )) 6= (W,S(W ))|W = i}
= Pr
{
3⋃
l=1
El
}
≤
3∑
l=1
Pr{El}. (30)
Indeed, Pr{E1} and Pr{E2} can be made smaller than δ for
large enough n by the standard technique of typical sets [3].
For Pr{E3}, it is sufficient to evaluate probabilities of the
following two events
E ′3: for some i′ 6= i such that (Zn, V ni′ ) ∈ A(n) (ZV ),
E ′′3 : for some i′ 6= i such that (Zn, Uni′ ) ∈ A(n) (ZU).
Recall that we set
RI = I(Y ;V )− I(Y ;U) + I(Z;U)− δ. (31)
Then we have
Pr{E ′3} ≤
∑
i′ 6=i
Pr
{
(Zn, V ni′ ) ∈ A(n) (ZV )
}
(a)
≤ MI2−n(I(Z;V )− δ2 )
= 2−n(I(Z;V )−
δ
2−RI)
= 2−n(I(Y ;U |V )−I(Z;U |V )+
δ
2 ) ≤ 2−nδ2 , (32)
and
Pr{E ′′3 } ≤
∑
i′ 6=i
Pr
{
(Zn, Uni′ ) ∈ A(n) (ZU)
}
(b)
≤ MI2−n(I(Z;U)− δ2 )
= 2−n(I(Z;U)−
δ
2−RI)
= 2−n(I(Y ;U)−I(Y ;V )+
δ
2 ) ≤ 2−nδ2 (33)
for large enough n, where (a) and (b) follow from the prop-
erties of the strongly typical set [3] and the last inequalities
of (32) and (33) follow because the Markov chain in (10) is
applied.
Therefore, the IEP of individual i can be made that
Pr{(Ŵ , ̂S(W )) 6= (W,S(W ))|W = i} ≤ 4δ (34)
for large enough n.
B. Analysis of Secrecy-Leakage
The mutual information on the right-hand side of (16) can
be expanded as
1
n
I(JG(i);SG(i)|Cn)
=
1
n
{
H(SG(i)|Cn) +H(JG(i)|Cn)
−H(Y ni , JG(i), SG(i)|Cn)
+H(Y ni |JG(i), SG(i), Cn)
}
=
1
n
H(SG(i)|Cn) + 1
n
H(JG(i)|Cn)− 1
n
H(Y ni )
+
1
n
H(Y ni |JG(i), SG(i), Cn)
(c)
≤ 1
n
H(SG(i)) +
1
n
H(JG(i))− 1
n
H(Y ni )
+
1
n
H(Y ni |JG(i), SG(i), Cn)
(d)
≤ 1
n
logMS +
1
n
logMJG −H(Y ) + δn log |Y|+
1
n
= I(Y ;U)− I(Y ;V )− δ + I(Y ;V ) + 2δ −H(Y )
+ δn log |Y|+ 1
n
≤ δ + δn log |Y|+ 1
n
, (35)
where (c) follows because conditioning reduces entropy and
(d) follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that entropy is
maximized when all signals in an alphabet are equally likely.
C. Analysis of Privacy-Leakage Rate
From the right-hand side of (18), it holds that
I(Xni ;JG(i)|Cn)
(e)
≤ I(Xni ;V ni |Cn)
= H(V ni |Cn)−H(V ni |Xni , Cn)
(f)
≤ logMJG −H(V ni |Xni , Cn)
= n(I(Y ;V ) + 2δ)−H(V ni |Xni , Cn), (36)
where (e) follows from the Markov chain Xni − V ni − J(i)
given Cn and (f) follows because the number of possible values
of V ni given Cn is MJG . Here, we evaluate the second term
in (36) as
H(V ni |Xni , Cn) = H(Y ni , V ni |Xni , Cn)−H(Y ni |V ni , Xni , Cn)
≥ H(Y ni |Xni , Cn)−H(Y ni |V ni , Xni , Cn)
(g)
= H(Y ni |Xni )−H(Y ni |V ni , Xni , Cn)
(h)
≥ nH(Y |X)− n(H(Y |V,X) + δn)
= n(I(Y ;V |X)− δn)
(i)
= n(H(V |X)−H(V |Y )− δn)
= n(I(Y ;V )− I(X;V )− δn), (37)
where (g) follows because Y ni and X
n
i are independent of Cn,
(h) follows from Lemma 2, and (i) holds due to X − Y − V .
From (36) and (37), we obtain
1
n
I(Xni ; J(i)|Cn) ≤ I(X;V ) + 3δ (38)
for all sufficiently large n.
APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTS FOR CONVERSE PART
A. Proof of Lemma 5
The proof of (22)–(25) can be done similarly by the well-
known argument (cf. [3]). We will prove only (22). We intro-
duce a timesharing variable Q which is uniformly distributed
over {1, 2, · · · , n} and is independent of all other RVs. The
left-hand side of (22) can be rewritten as
n∑
t=1
I(Zt;Ut) = nI(ZQ;UQ|Q)
= n
{
1
n
n∑
t=1
I(Zt;Ut|Q = t)
}
= n[I(ZQ;UQ, Q)− I(ZQ;Q)]
= nI(ZQ;UQ, Q). (39)
By denoting U = (UQ, Q), Z = ZQ, X = XQ, and Y = YQ,
(22) obviously holds.
To complete the proof, we need to verify that Zt−Xt(W )−
Yt(W )−Ut−Vt holds. We shall first check that Zt−Xt(W )−
Yt(W ) − Ut holds. To prove this claim, we have to verify
that Zt −Xt(W )− Yt(W ), Xt(W )− Yt(W )−Ut, and Zt −
(Xt(W ), Yt(W )) − Ut. Indeed, the first and second Markov
chains clearly hold and the last one can be checked as
I(Zt;Ut|Xt(W ), Yt(W ))
= H(Ut|Xt(W ), Yt(W ))−H(Ut|Xt(W ), Yt(W ), Zt)
= H(Zt−1, J(W ), S(W )|Xt(W ), Yt(W ))
−H(Zt−1, J(W ), S(W )|Xt(W ), Yt(W ), Zt)
= H(Zt−1|Xt(W ), Yt(W ))
+H(J(W ), S(W )|Xt(W ), Yt(W ), Zt−1)
−H(Zt−1|Xt(W ), Yt(W ), Zt)
−H(J(W ), S(W )|Xt(W ), Yt(W ), Zt, Zt−1)
(40)
(a)
= H(J(W ), S(W )|Xt(W ), Yt(W ), Zt−1)
−H(J(W ), S(W )|Xt(W ), Yt(W ), Zt−1, Zt)
(b)
= H(J(W ), S(W )|Xt(W ), Yt(W ), Zt−1)
−H(J(W ), S(W )|Xt(W ), Yt(W ), Zt−1) = 0,
(41)
where (a) holds because every symbol of bio-data sequences
is i.i.d. generated so the first and third terms in (40) cancel
each other and (b) follows Zt − (Zt−1, Xt(W ), Yt(W )) −
(J(W ), S(W )). Thus, Zt −Xt(W )− Yt(W )−Ut holds and
since Vt is a function of Ut, it follows that Zt − Xt(W ) −
Yt(W )− Ut − Vt also forms a Markov chain.
B. Analysis of Identification and Secrecy Rates
We expand the mutual information in (21) as
I(W,S(W ); J(1), · · · , J(MI), Zn)
= I(W,S(W ); J(1), · · · , J(MI))
+ I(W,S(W );Zn|J(1), · · · , J(MI))
(c)
= I(S(W ); J(1), · · · , J(MI)|W )
+ I(W,S(W );Zn|J(1), · · · , J(MI))
(d)
≤ 1
MI
MI∑
i=1
I(S(i); J(i)) +H(Zn)
−H(Zn|J(1), · · · , J(MI),W, S(W ))
(e)
≤ nδ +H(Zn)−H(Zn|J(W ), S(W ))
(f)
= nδ +
n∑
t=1
{
H(Zt)−H(Zt|Zt−1, J(W ), S(W ))
}
= nδ +
n∑
t=1
I(Zt;Ut)
(g)
= nδ + nI(Z;U), (42)
where (c) follows because W is independent of
J(1), · · · , J(MI), (d) holds because W is uniformly
distributed over I and I(S(W ); J(W )|W = i) is defined
by I(S(i); J(i)), (e) holds due to (9) and the Markov
chain Zn − (J(W ), S(W )) − (J(1), · · · , J(W − 1), J(W +
1), · · · , J(MI)), (f) holds due to the chain rule of entropy,
and (g) follows because of (22) in Lemma 5.
From (20), (21), and (42), we obtain
H(W,S(W )) ≤ 1 + δ logMIMS + nδ + nI(Z;U). (43)
For the achievable pair (RI , RS), some manipulations as in
[8, Proof of Theorem 1] yield
1
n
logMIMS ≤ 1
1− δ
(
I(Z;U) + 2δ +
1
n
)
, (44)
and thus from (5) and (7), we obtain
RI +RS − 2δ ≤ 1
1− δ
(
I(Z;U) + 2δ +
1
n
)
. (45)
Furthermore, we verify the range of RI . From (24), we have
nI(Y ;V )
=
n∑
t=1
I(Yt(W );Vt)
=
n∑
t=1
I(Yt(W );Z
t−1, J(W ))
=
n∑
t=1
{H(Yt(W ))−H(Yt(W )|Zt−1, J(W ))}
=
n∑
t=1
{
H(Yt(W ))−H(Yt(W )|Zt−1, J(W ), S(W ))
− I(Yt(W );S(W )|J(W ), Zt−1)
}
= nI(Y ;U)−
n∑
t=1
I(Yt(W );S(W )|J(W ), Zt−1), (46)
where the first term of (46) follows from (23) in Lemma 5.
We further expand the second term in (46). We intro-
duce new RVs Y˜ nW , Z˜
n, J˜(W ), and S˜(W ) taking values in
Yn,Zn,J , and S, respectively, whose distributions satisfy
PY˜t(W ),Z˜t,J˜(W ) = PYt(W ),Zt,J(W ), (47)
PY˜ n
W
,Z˜n|J˜(W ) =
n∏
t=1
PY˜t(W ),Z˜t|Z˜t−1,J˜(W ), (48)
PY˜t(W ),Z˜t,J˜(W ),S˜(W ) = PS(W )|Yt(W ),Zt,J(W )
· PY˜t(W ),Z˜t,J˜(W ). (49)
Note that we can always pick these RVs. Equation (48) indi-
cates that the Markov chain (Y˜t(W ), Z˜t) − (Z˜t−1, J˜(W )) −
Y˜ t−1(W ) holds. Equations (47) and (49) indicate that
PY˜t(W ),Z˜t,J˜(W ),S˜(W ) = PYt(W ),Zt,J(W ),S(W ) (50)
for any t ∈ [1, n].
Then, by the chain rule of mutual information, we obtain
I(Y˜ nW , Z˜
n; S˜(W )|J˜(W ))
=
n∑
t=1
I(Y˜t(W ), Z˜t; S˜(W )|Y˜ t−1(W ), Z˜t−1, J˜(W ))
≥
n∑
t=1
I(Y˜t(W ), Z˜t; S˜(W )|Z˜t−1, J˜(W ))
(h)
=
n∑
t=1
I(Yt(W ), Zt;S(W )|Zt−1, J(W ))
≥
n∑
t=1
I(Yt(W );S(W )|Zt−1, J(W )), (51)
where (h) follows due to (50). Then,
n∑
t=1
I(Yt(W );S(W )|Zt−1, J(W ))
≤ I(Y˜ n(W ), Z˜n; S˜(W )|J˜(W ))
≤ H(S˜(W )) ≤ logMS . (52)
From (5), (44), (46), and (52), we obtain
I(Y ;V ) ≥ I(Y ;U)− 11−δ
(
I(Z;U) + 2δ + 1n
)
+RI − δ.
(53)
C. Analysis of Privacy-Leakage Rate
From (8), it holds that
n(RL + δ)
≥ I(XnW ; J(W ))
= H(XnW )−H(XnW |J(W ))
=
n∑
t=1
{H(Xt(W ))−H(Xt(W )|Xt−1(W ), J(W ))}
(i)
=
n∑
t=1
{H(Xt(W ))−H(Xt(W )|Zt−1, Xt−1(W ), J(W ))}
≥
n∑
t=1
{
H(Xt(W ))−H(Xt(W )|Zt−1, J(W ))
}
=
n∑
t=1
I(Xt(W );Vt) = nI(X;V ), (54)
where (i) holds due to Zt−1 − (Xt−1(W ), J(W )) −Xt(W )
and the last equality in (54) follows from (25) in Lemma 5.
